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Abstract
We focus on the problem of finding an optimal strategy for a team of two players that faces an opponent in an
imperfect-information zero-sum extensive-form game. Team members are not allowed to communicate during play
but can coordinate before the game. In that setting, it is known that the best the team can do is sample a profile
of potentially randomized strategies (one per player) from a joint (a.k.a. correlated) probability distribution at the
beginning of the game. In this paper, we first provide new modeling results about computing such an optimal
distribution by drawing a connection to a different literature on extensive-form correlation. Second, we provide an
algorithm that computes such an optimal distribution by only using profiles where only one of the team members
gets to randomize in each profile. We can also cap the number of such profiles we allow in the solution. This begets
an anytime algorithm by increasing the cap. We find that often a handful of well-chosen such profiles suffices to
reach optimal utility for the team. This enables team members to reach coordination through a relatively simple and
understandable plan. Finally, inspired by this observation and leveraging theoretical concepts that we introduce, we
develop an efficient column-generation algorithm for finding an optimal distribution for the team. We evaluate it on a
suite of common benchmark games. It is three orders of magnitude faster than the prior state of the art on games that
the latter can solve and it can also solve several games that were previously unsolvable.
1. Introduction
Much of the computational game theory literature has
focused on finding strong strategies for large two-player
zero-sum extensive-form games. In that setting, perfect game
playing corresponds to playing strategies that belong to
a Nash equilibrium, and such strategies can be found in
polynomial time in the size of the game. Recent landmark
results, such as superhuman agents for heads-up limit
and no-limit Texas hold’em poker (Bowling et al., 2015;
Brown & Sandholm, 2019; Moravcˇı´k et al., 2017) show that
the problem of computing strong strategies in two-player
zero-sum games is well understood both in theory and in
practice. The same cannot be said for almost any type of
strategic multi-player interaction, where computing strong
strategies is generally hard in the worst case. Also, all
superhuman AI gaming milestones have been in two-player
zero-sum games, with the exception of multi-player no-limit
Texas hold’em recently (Brown & Sandholm, 2019).
In this paper, we study adversarial team games, that is,
games in which a team of coordinating (colluding) players
faces an opponent. We will focus on a two-player team
coordinating against a third player. Team members can plan
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jointly at will before the game, but are not allowed to
communicate during the game (other than through their
actions in the game). These games are a popular middle
ground between two-player zero-sum games and multiplayer
games (von Stengel & Koller, 1997; Celli & Gatti, 2018).
They can be used to model many strategic interactions of
practical relevance. For example, how should two players
colluding against a third at a poker table play? Or, how
would the two defenders in Bridge (who are prohibited from
communicating privately during the game) play optimally
against the declarer? Even though adversarial team games are
conceptually zero-sum interactions between two entities—
the team and the opponent—computing optimal strategies is
hard in this setting. Even finding a best-response strategy
for the team given a fixed strategy for the opponent is
hard (Celli & Gatti, 2018).
One might think that finding the optimal strategy for the team
simply amounts to finding an optimal profile of potentially
mixed (a.k.a. randomized) strategies, one strategy per team
members. A solution of this type that yields maximum
expected sum of utilities for the team players against a
rational (that is, best-responding) opponent is known as
a team-maxmin equilibrium (TME) strategy (Basilico et al.,
2017; Zhang & An, 2020a;b).
In this paper, we are interested in a more powerful model.
Before the game starts, the team members are able to sample
a profile from a joint (a.k.a. correlated) distribution. This
form of ex-ante coordination is known to be the best a
team can do and comes with two major advantages. First, it
offers the team larger (or equal) expected utility than TME—
sometimes with dramatic gains (Celli & Gatti, 2018). Second,
it makes the problem of computing the optimal team strategy
convex—and thus more amenable to the plethora of convex
optimization algorithms that have been developed over the
past 80 years—whereas the problem of computing a TME
strategy is not convex. In our model, an optimal distribution
for the team is known as a team-maxmin equilibrium with
coordination device (TMECor) strategy (Celli & Gatti, 2018;
Farina et al., 2018). Finding a TMECor strategy is NP-hard
and inapproximable (Celli & Gatti, 2018).
We propose a new formulation for the problem of finding
a TMECor strategy. In doing so, we introduce the key
notion of a semi-randomized correlation plan and draw
connections with a particular strategy polytope defined
by von Stengel & Forges (2008). Second, we propose an
algorithm for computing a TMECor strategy when only a
fixed number of pairs of semi-randomized correlation plans
is allowed. This begets an anytime algorithm by increasing
that fixed number.We find that often a handful of well-chosen
semi-randomized correlation plans is enough to reach optimal
utility. This enables team members to reach coordination
through simple and understandable strategies. Finally, by
leveraging the theoretical concepts that we introduce, we
develop an efficient optimal column-generation algorithm for
finding a TMECor strategy. We evaluate it on a suite of
common benchmark games. It is three orders of magnitude
faster than the prior state of the art on games that the latter
can solve. It can also solve many games that were previously
unsolvable.
2. Preliminaries: Extensive-Form Games
Extensive-form games (EFGs) are a standard model in game
theory. They model games that are played on a game tree, and
can capture both sequential and simultaneous moves, as well
as private information. In this paper, we focus on three-player
zero-sum games where two players—T1 and T2—play as a
team against the opponent player, denoted by O.
Each node v in the game tree belongs to exactly one player
i ∈ {T1,T2,O} ∪ {C} whose turn is to move. Player C is a
special player, called the chance player. It models exogenous
stochasticity in the environment, such as drawing a card from
a deck or tossing a coin. The edges leaving v represent the
actions available at that node. Any node without outgoing
edges is called a leaf and represents an end state of the
game. We denote the set of such nodes by Z . Each z ∈ Z
is associated with a tuple of payoffs specifying the payoff
ui(z) of each player i ∈ {T1,T2,O} at z. The product of
the probabilities of all actions of C on the path from the root
of the game to leaf z is denoted by pC(z).
Private information is represented via information set (in-
foset). In particular, the set of nodes belonging to i ∈
{T1,T2,O} is partitioned into a collection Ii of non-empty
sets: each I ∈ Ii groups together nodes that Player i cannot
distinguish among, given what they have observed. Necessar-
ily, for any I ∈ Ii and v, w ∈ I , nodes v and w must have the
same set of available actions. Consequently, we denote the set
of actions available at all nodes of I byAI . As it is customary
in the related literature, we assume perfect recall, that is, no
player forgets what he/she knew earlier in the game. Finally,
given players i and j, two infosets Ii ∈ Ii, Ij ∈ Ij are con-
nected, denoted by Ii ⇋ Ij , if there exist v ∈ Ii and w ∈ Ij
such that the path from the root to v passes throughw or vice
versa.
Sequences. The set of sequences of Player i, denoted by Σi,
is defined as Σi := {(I, a) : I ∈ Ii, a ∈ AI} ∪ {∅}, where
the special element ∅ is called the empty sequence of Player
i. The parent sequence of a node v of Player i, denoted σ(v),
is the last sequence (information set-action pair) for Player
i encountered on the path from the root of the game to that
node. Since the game has perfect recall, for each I ∈ Ii,
nodes belonging to I share the same parent sequence. So,
given I ∈ Ii, we denote by σ(I) ∈ Σi the unique parent
sequence of nodes in I . Additionally, we let σ(I) = ∅ if
2
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Player i never acts before infoset I .
Relevant sequences. A pair of sequences σi ∈ Σi, σj ∈ Σj
is relevant if either one is the empty sequence, or if the
can be written as σi = (Ii, ai) and σj = (Ij , aj) with
Ii ⇋ Ij . We write σi ⊲⊳ σ2 to denote that they form a
pair of relevant sequences. Given two players i and j, we
let Σi ⊲⊳ Σj := {(σi, σj) : σi ∈ Σi, σj ∈ Σj , σi ⊲⊳ σj}.
Similarly, given σi and Ij ∈ Ij , we say that (σi, Ij) forms a
relevant sequence-information set pair (σi ⊲⊳ Ij), if σi = ∅
or if σi = (Ii, ai) and Ii ⇋ Ij .
Reduced-normal-form plans. A reduced-normal-form plan
πi for Player i defines a choice of action for every information
set I ∈ Ii that is still reachable as a result of the other choices
in π itself. The set of reduced-normal-form plans of Player i
is denoted Πi. We denote by Πi(I) the subset of reduced-
normal-form plans that prescribe all actions for Player i on
the path from the root to information set I ∈ Ii. Similarly,
given σ = (I, a) ∈ Σi, let Πi(σ) ⊆ Πi(I) be the set of
reduced-normal-form plans belonging to Πi(I) where Player
i plays action a at I , and let Πi(∅) := Πi. Finally, given a
leaf z ∈ Z , we denote with Πi(z) ⊆ Πi the set of reduced-
normal-form where Player i plays so as to reach z.
Sequence-form strategies. A sequence-form strategy is a
compact strategy representation for perfect-recall players
in EFGs (Romanovskii, 1962; Koller et al., 1996). Given a
player i ∈ {T1,T2,O} and a normal-form strategy µ ∈
∆(Πi),
1 the sequence-form strategy induced by µ is the
real vector y, indexed over σ ∈ Σi, defined as y[σ] :=∑
π∈Πi(σ)
µ(π). The set of sequence-form strategies that can
be induced as µ varies over ∆(Πi) is denoted by Yi and
is known to be a convex polytope (called the sequence-
form polytope) defined by a number of constraints equal to
|Ii| (Koller et al., 1996).
3. TMECor Formulation and Prior Work
A TMECor strategy is a probability distribution µT over the
set of randomized strategy profiles YT1×YT2 that guarantees
maximum expected utility for the team against the best-
responding opponent O. Since each player has perfect recall,
any randomized strategy for a player is equivalent to a
distribution over reduced-normal-formpure strategies (Kuhn,
1953). Hence, any distribution over profiles of randomized
strategies of the team members can be expressed in an
equivalent way as a distribution over deterministic strategy
profiles ΠT1 ×ΠT2. The benefit of this transformation is that
ΠT1 × ΠT2 is a finite set, unlike YT1 × YT2. For this reason,
TMECor is usually defined in the literature as a distribution
overΠT1×ΠT2 without loss of generality. We will follow the
same approach in our characterization.
1∆(X) denotes the probability simplex over the finite set X .
TMECor as a Bilinear Saddle-Point Problem. For each
leaf z, let uˆT(z) := (uT1(z) + uT2(z))pC(z). The expected
utility of the team can be written as the following function of
the distributions of play µT ∈ ∆(ΠT1 ×ΠT2), µO ∈ ∆(ΠO):
uT(µT, µO) :=
∑
z∈Z
uˆT(z)


∑
πT1∈ΠT1(z)
πT2∈ΠT2(z)
µT(πT1, πT2)



∑
π∈ΠO(z)
µO(π)

.
By definition, a team-maxmin equilibrium with coordination
device (TMECor) is a Nash equilibrium of the game where
the team plays according to the coordinated strategy µT ∈
∆(ΠT1 × ΠT2). In the zero-sum setting, this amounts to
finding a solution of the optimization problem
argmax
µT∈∆(ΠT1×ΠT2)
min
µO∈∆(ΠO)
uT(µT, µO). (1)
The opponent’s strategy µO can be compactly represented
through its equivalent sequence-form representation. This is
not the case for µT, which cannot be represented concisely
through the sequence form as shown by Farina et al. (2018).
Prior algorithms. Prior work on the computation of
TMECor mainly differs in the way the team’s distribution
µT is represented. Celli & Gatti (2018) directly represent the
strategy as a probability distribution over the set of joint
reduced-normal-form plans ΠT1 × ΠT2. The number of bits
required to store such a distribution is exponential in the size
of the game tree in the worst case. They propose a column-
generation approach in which, at each iteration, a new pair
of pure strategies is added to the support of the distribution
µT. Farina et al. (2018) show that it suffices to employ |Z|-
dimensional vectors of realizations where each z is mapped
to its probability of being reached when the team follows µT.
A realization-form strategy is a more concise representation
than the original distribution µT. The authors propose a
structural decomposition of the problem which is then used
to prove convergence of a fictitious-play-like algorithm.
4. A Formulation of TMECor Based on
Extensive-Form Correlation Plans
We propose using a different representation of the correlated
distribution of play µT, inspired by the growing body of
literature on extensive-form correlated equilibria. Like the
realization form by Farina et al. (2018), in our approach we
represent µT as a vector with only a polynomial number
of components. However, unlike the realization form, the
number of components scales as the product of the number
of sequences of the two players, which can be significantly
larger than the number of leaves. This downside is amply
outweighed by the following benefits. First, we show that
in practice our proposed representation of µT enables us to
3
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compute best responses for the team significantly faster than
the prior representations. Second, in certain classes of games,
we even show that our proposed representation enables the
computation of a TMECor in polynomial time. This is the
case, for example, in Goofspiel, a popular benchmark game
in computational game theory (Ross, 1971).
4.1. Extensive-Form Correlation Plans
Our representation is based on the concept of extensive-
form correlation plans, introduced by von Stengel & Forges
(2008) in their seminal paper on extensive-form correlation.
In particular, we map the correlated distribution of play µT
of the team to the vector ξT indexed over pairs of sequences
(σT1, σT2) ∈ ΣT1 ⊲⊳ ΣT2, where each entry is defined as
ξT[(σT1, σT2)] :=
∑
πT1∈ΠT1(σT1)
πT2∈ΠT2(σT2)
µT[(πT1, πT2)]. (2)
Here ξT is not indexed over all pairs of sequences (σT1, σT2)—
only relevant sequence pairs. While there are games in which
this distinction is meaningless (that is, games in which all se-
quences pairs for the team members are relevant), in practice
the number of relevant sequence pairs is only a tiny fraction
of the total number of sequence pairs, as shown in Table 1(b).
The set of extensive-form correlation plans ξT that can be
induced as µT varies over the set of all correlated distributions
of play for the teammembers is a convex polytope.We denote
it as ΞT and call it the polytope of correlation plans. We
will recall existing results and provide new ones about the
structure of ΞT in Section 5.
4.2. Computing a TMECor using Correlation Plans
Extensive-form correlation plans encode a superset of the
information encoded by realization plans. Indeed, for all
z, ξT[σT1(z), σT2(z)] = ρT[z]. Using the previous identity,
we can rewrite the problem of computing a TMECor of a
constant-sum game (1) as
argmax
ξT∈ΞT
min
yO∈YO
∑
z∈Z
uˆT(z)ξT[σT1(z), σT2(z)]y[σO(z)].
By dualizing the inner linear minimization problem over yO,
we get the following proposition that shows that a TMECor
can be found as the solution to a linear program (LP) with a
polynomial number of variables. (All the proofs of this paper
can be found in the appendix.)
Proposition 1. An extensive-form correlation plan ξT is a
TMECor if and only if it is a solution to the LP


argmax
ξT
v∅, subject to:
1 vI −
∑
I′∈IO
σO(I
′)=(I,a)
vI′ ≤
∑
z∈Z
σO(z)=(I,a)
uˆT(z)ξT[σT1(z), σT2(z)]
∀ (I,a)∈ΣO\{∅}
2 v∅ −
∑
I′∈IO
σO(I
′)=∅
vI′ ≤
∑
z∈Z
σO(z)=∅
uˆT(z)ξT[σT1(z), σT2(z)]
3 v∅ free, vI free ∀ I ∈ IO
4 ξT ∈ ΞT.
As a direct consequence of Proposition 1, a TMECor can be
found in polynomial time whenever ΞT can be represented
as the intersection of a set of polynomially many linear
constraints. In Section 5, we recall when that is the case.
5. Semi-Randomized Correlation Plans and the
Structure of ΞT
Even though ΞT is a convex polytope, the set of (potentially
exponentially many) linear constraints that define it is not
known in general. So, alternative characterizations of the set
ΞT are needed before the LP in Proposition 1 can be solved. In
this section, we recall two known results about the structure
of ΞT, and propose a new one (Proposition 3). We will use
our result to arrive at two different approaches to tackle the
LP of Proposition 1 in Section 6 and 7, respectively.
5.1. Containment in the von Stengel-Forges Polytope
The first result about the structure of ΞT has to do with a par-
ticular polytope that was introduced by von Stengel & Forges
(2008).
Definition 1. The von Stengel-Forges polytope of the
team, denoted VT, is the polytope of all vectors ξ ∈
R
|ΣT1⊲⊳ΣT2|
≥0 indexed over relevant sequence pairs that satisfy
the following polynomially-sized set of linear constraints.
1 ξ[∅,∅] = 1
2
∑
aT1∈AIT1
ξ[(IT1, aT1), σT2] = ξ[σ(IT1), σT2] ∀IT1 ⊲⊳ σT2
3
∑
aT2∈AIT2
ξ[σT1, (IT2, aT2)] = ξ[σT1, σ(IT2)] ∀σT1 ⊲⊳ IT2.
These can be interpreted as “probability mass conservation”
constraints. They are interlaced sequence-form constraints.
The following result by von Stengel & Forges (2008) is
immediate from the definition of ξT in (2).
Proposition 2 (von Stengel & Forges (2008)). The set of
extensive-form correlation plans is a subset of the von
Stengel-Forges polytope. Formally, ΞT ⊆ VT.
4
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Game instance
Num. sequences Num. leaves |ΣT1 ⊲⊳ ΣT2|
|Z|
|ΣT1 × ΣT2|
|ΣT1 ⊲⊳ ΣT2|
Triangle-free?
|Σ1| |Σ2| |Σ3| |Z| O = 1 O = 2 O = 3
[A] Kuhn poker (3 ranks) 25 25 25 78 3.40 2.36 ✗ ✗ ✗
[B] Kuhn poker (4 ranks) 33 33 33 312 1.59 2.19 ✗ ✗ ✗
[C] Kuhn poker (12 ranks) 97 97 97 17 160 0.29 1.90 ✗ ✗ ✗
[D] Goofspiel (3 ranks, limited info) 934 934 934 1296 9.54 70.59 ✓ ✓ ✓
[E] Goofspiel (3 ranks) 1630 1630 1630 1296 15.53 131.96 ✓ ✓ ✓
[F] Liar’s dice (3 faces) 1021 1021 1021 13 797 5.26 14.42 ✗ ✗ ✗
[G] Liar’s dice (4 faces) 10 921 10 921 10 921 262 080 6.25 72.79 ✗ ✗ ✗
[H] Leduc poker (3 ranks, 1 raise) 457 457 457 4500 2.62 17.70 ✗ ✗ ✗
[I] Leduc poker (4 ranks, 1 raise) 801 801 801 16908 1.34 28.36 ✗ ✗ ✗
[J] Leduc poker (2 ranks, 2 raises) 1443 1443 1443 3786 7.28 75.59 ✗ ✗ ✗
(a)— Game instances and sizes (b) (c)
Table 1: (a) Size of the game instances used in our experiments, in terms of number of sequences |Σi| for each player i, and
number of leaves |Z|. (b) Ratio between the number of leaves |Z|, number of sequence pairs for the team members |ΣT1×ΣT2|,
and number of relevant sequence pairs for the team members |ΣT1 ⊲⊳ ΣT2| in various benchmark games. For all games reported
in the subtable, we chose the first two players to act as the team members. (c) The subtable reports whether the interaction of
the team members is triangle-free (Farina & Sandholm, 2020), given the opponent player O.
5.2. Triangle-Freeness and Polynomial-Time
Computation of TMECor
Proposition 2 shows that ΞT is a subset of the von Stengel-
Forges polytope. There are games where the reverse inclu-
sion does not hold. Farina & Sandholm (2020) gave a suffi-
cient condition—called triangle-freeness—for the reverse in-
clusion to hold. We state the condition for our setting.
Definition 2 (Farina & Sandholm (2020)). The interaction
of the team members T1 and T2 is triangle-free if, for
any choice of distinct information sets I1, I2 ∈ IT1 with
σT1(I1) = σT1(I2) and any choice of distinct information
sets J1, J2 ∈ IT2 with σT2(J1) = σT2(J2), it is never the
case that (I1 ⇋ J1) ∧ (I2 ⇋ J2) ∧ (I1 ⇋ J2).
Farina & Sandholm (2020) show that when the information
structure of correlating players (in our case, the team
members) is triangle-free, then ΞT = VT. So, when the
interaction of the team is triangle-free, a TMECor can be
found in polynomial time by substituting constraint 4 in the
LP in Proposition 1 with the von Stengel-Forges constraints
of Definition 1. As far as we are aware, this positive
complexity result has not been noted before in the literature.
We show in Table 1(c) that Goofspiel is triangle free (and that
none of the other common benchmark games that we consider
are).
5.3. Semi-Randomized Correlation Plans
We now give a third result about the structure of ΞT, which
will enable us to replace Constraint 4 of Proposition 1
with something more practical. First, we introduce semi-
randomized correlation plans, which are subsets of the von
Stengel-Forges polytope of the team. They represent strategy
profiles in which one of the players plays a deterministic
strategy, while the other player in the team independently
plays a randomized strategy. Formally, we define the set of
semi-randomized correlation plans for T1 and T2 as
Ξ∗T1 = {ξ ∈ VT : ξ[∅, σT2] ∈ {0, 1} ∀ σT2 ∈ ΣT2},
Ξ∗T2 = {ξ ∈ VT : ξ[σT1,∅] ∈ {0, 1} ∀ σT1 ∈ ΣT1},
respectively. Crucially, a point ξ ∈ Ξ∗i for i ∈ {T1,T2} can
be expressed using real and binary variables, in addition to
the linear constraints the define V (Definition 1).
With that, we can show the following structural result for the
polytope of extensive-form correlation plans ΞT.
Proposition 3. In every game, ΞT is the convex hull of the set
Ξ∗
T1
, or equivalently of the set Ξ∗
T2
. Formally, ΞT = coΞ
∗
T1
=
coΞ∗
T2
= co(Ξ∗
T1
∪ Ξ∗
T2
).
6. Computing TMECor with a Small Support
of Semi-Randomized Plans of Fixed Size
From Proposition 3, it is known that ΞT is the convex hull
of Ξ∗
T1
and Ξ∗
T2
. Furthermore, the polytopes Ξ∗
T1
and Ξ∗
T2
can be described via a number of linear constraints that is
quadratic in the game size and a number of integer variables
that is linear in the game size. So, we can replace Constraint
4 in Proposition 1 with the constraint that ξT be a convex
combination of elements from Ξ∗
T1
and Ξ∗
T2
. We introduce
variables ξ
(1)
T
, . . . , ξ
(n)
T
∈ Ξ∗
T1
∪ Ξ∗
T2
and the corresponding
convex combination coefficients λ(1), . . . , λ(n), and replace
Constraint 4 with the linear constraint ξT =
∑n
i=1 λ
(i)ξ
(i)
T
.
Here, n is a parameter with which we can cap the number of
semi-randomized correlation plans that can be included in the
5
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Game
Opponent player O = 1 Opponent player O = 2 Opponent player O = 3
n = 1 n = 2 n = 3 n =∞ n = 1 n = 2 n = 3 n =∞ n = 1 n = 2 n = 3 n =∞
Kuhn
poker
[A] 0 ⋆ ⋆ 0 0 ⋆ ⋆ 0 0 ⋆ ⋆ 0
[B] 0.0208 0.0379 ⋆ 0.0379 0.0018 0.0246 0.0265 0.0265 −0.0417 ⋆ ⋆ −0.0417
[C] 0.0470 0.0655 0.0663 0.0664 0.0128 0.0367 0.0376 0.0380 −0.0227 −0.0153 −0.0141 −0.0140
Goofspiel
[D] 0.2389 0.2524 ⋆ 0.2524 0.2389 0.2524 ⋆ 0.2524 0.2389 0.2524 ⋆ 0.2524
[E] 0.2389 0.2534 ⋆ 0.2534 0.2389 0.2534 ⋆ 0.2534 0.2389 0.2534 ⋆ 0.2534
Liar’s
dice
[F] 0 ⋆ ⋆ 0 0.2099 0.2554 0.2562 0.2562 0.2716 0.2840 ⋆ 0.2840
[G] 0.0625 ⋆ ⋆ 0.0625 0.2500 0.2656 0.2656 — 0.2656 — — —
Leduc
poker
[H] 0.1453 0.2246 0.2466 0.2765 0.2107 0.2863 0.3143 0.3450 0.1840 0.2448 0.2815 0.2926
[I] — — — 0.1422 — — — 0.1420 — — — 0.0850
[J] 0.2449 0.7037 0.7975 0.8359 0.2101 0.9222 0.9695 0.9709 0.2449 0.7037 0.7975 0.8359
Table 2: Expected utility of the team for varying support sizes (n). All values for n ∈ {1, 2, 3}were computed using the MIP of
Section 6, while the values corresponding to n = ∞ were computed using our column generation approach (Section 7). ‘⋆‘:
A provably optimal utility has already been obtained with a lower value of the support size n. ‘—‘: We were unable to compute
the exact value, because the corresponding algorithm hit the time limit.
strategy. This gives the following mixed integer LP.


argmax
ξ
(1)
T
,...,ξ
(n)
T
,λ(1),...,λ(n)
v∅, subject to:
constraints 1 2 3 as in Proposition 1
4 ξT =
∑n
i=1 λ
(i)ξ
(i)
T
5 ξ
(1)
T
∈ Ξ∗
T1
, ξ
(2)
T
∈ Ξ∗
T2
, ξ
(3)
T
∈ Ξ∗
T1
, ξ
(4)
T
∈ Ξ∗
T2
, . . .‡
6
∑n
i=1 λ
(i) = 1, λ(i) ≥ 0 ∀i ∈ {1, . . . , n}.
The larger n is, the higher the solution value obtained, but
the slower the program. We can make this into an anytime
algorithm by solving the integer program for increasing
values of n. By Caratheodory’s theorem, this program already
yields an optimal solution to the LP in Proposition 1 when
n ≥ |Σ1 ⊲⊳ Σ2| + 1. As we show in detail in Section 8,
in practice we found that near-optimal coordination can be
achieved through strategies with a significantly smaller value
of n. Hence, oftentimes the team does not need a large
number of complex profiles of randomized strategies to play
optimally: a handful of carefully selected simple strategies
often result in optimal coordination.
7. A Fast Column Generation Approach
In this section, we show a different approach to solving the LP
in Proposition 1—using column generation (Ford & Fulkerson,
1958). First, we proceed with a seeding phase. We pick a set
S containing one or more points ξ
(1)
T
, ξ
(2)
T
, . . . , ξ
(m)
T
that are
known to belong to ΞT. Then, the main loop starts. First, for
‡In Constraint 5 we alternate the set of semi-randomized
correlation plans (i.e., we alternate which player’s turn it is to play
a deterministic strategy). Empirically, this increases the diversity of
the strategies of ΞT that can be represented with small values of n
and leads to higher utilities for the team.
i ∈ {1, . . . , |S|}, let
β(i)(σO) :=
∑
z∈Z
σO(z)=σO
uˆT(z)ξ
(i)
T
[σT1(z), σT2(z)] ∀ σO ∈ ΣO.
Then we solve the LP of Proposition 1 where Constraint 4
has been substituted with ξT ∈ coS:
(∗) :


argmax
λ(1),..., λ(|S|)
v∅, subject to:
1 vI −
∑
I′∈IO
σO(I
′)=σO
vI′ −
|S|∑
i=1
β(i)(σO)λ
(i) ≤ 0
∀σO∈ΣO\{∅}
2 v∅ −
∑
I′∈IO
σO(I
′)=∅
vI′ −
|S|∑
i=1
β(i)(∅)λ(i) ≤ 0
3
∑|S|
i=1 λ
(i) = 1
4 λ(i) ≥ 0 ∀ i ∈ {1, . . . , |S|}
5 v∅ free, vI free ∀ I ∈ IO.
This is called the master LP.2
Given the solution to the master LP, a pricing problem is
created. The goal of the pricing problem is to generate a new
element ξ
|S|+1
T
to be added to S so as to increase the team
utility in the next iteration, that is, the next solve of the master
LP that then has an additional variable. This main loop of
solving the larger and larger master LP keeps repeating until
termination (discussed later).
2In (∗) the convex combination is among given correlation
plans, while in the MIP of Section 6, the elements to combine are
themselves variables.
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7.1. The Pricing Problem
The pricing problem consist of finding a correlation plan ξˆT ∈
ΞT which, if included in the convex combination computed
by (∗), would lead to the maximum gradient of the objective
(that is, the maximum reduced cost). By exploiting the theory
of linear programming duality, such a correlation plan can
be computed starting from the solution of the dual of (∗).
In particular, let γ be the |ΣO|-dimensional vector of dual
variables corresponding to Constraints 1 and 2 of (∗), and
γ′ ∈ R be the dual variable corresponding to Constraint 3 .
Then, the reduced cost of any candidate ξˆT is
c(ξˆT) := −γ
′ +
∑
z∈Z
uˆT(z)ξˆT[σT1(z), σT2(z)]γ[σO(z)].
Now comes our crucial observation. Since c(ξˆT) is a linear
function, and since from Proposition 3 we know that ΞT =
coΞ∗
T1
, by convexity
max
ξˆT∈ΞT
c(ξˆT) = max
ξˆT∈Ξ
∗
T1
c(ξˆT).
We want to solve the LP on the left hand side, but—as
discussed in Section 5—the constraints defining ΞT are not
known. The above equality enables us to solve the problem
because the right hand side is a well-defined mixed integer
LP (MIP). We can use a commercial solver such as Gurobi
to solve it. When the objective value of the pricing problem
is non-positive, there is no variable that can be added to the
master LP which would increase its value. Thus, the optimal
solution to the master LP is guaranteed to be optimal for the
LP in Proposition 1 and the main loop terminates.
7.2. Implementation Details
We further speed up the solution of the pricing problem in our
implementation by the following techniques.
Seeding phase. To avoid having to go through many
iterations of the main loop, each of which requires solving
the pricing problem, we want to seed the master LP up
front with a set of good candidate variables. While any
seedingmaintains optimality of the overall algorithm, seeding
it with variables that are likely to be part of the optimal
solution increases speed the most. We initialize the set of
correlation plans S by running m iterations of a self-play
no-external-regret algorithm. Specifically, we let each player
run CFR+ (Tammelin et al., 2015; Bowling et al., 2015) and,
at each iteration of that algorithm, we sample a pair of pure
normal-form plans for the two team members according to
the current strategies of the two players. At each iteration of
that no-regret method, we set the utility of each team member
to uT1 + uT2. Finally, for each pair (πT1, πT2) ∈ ΠT1 × ΠT2
of normal-form plans generated by that no-regret algorithm,
we compute and add to S the correlation plan corresponding
to the distribution µ that assigns probability 1 to (πT1, πT2)
using Eq. (2). While self-play no-regret methods guarantee
convergence to Nash equilibrium in two-player zero-sum
game, no guarantee is available in our setting. However, we
empirically find that this seeding strategy leads to a strong
initial set of correlation plans.
Linear relaxation. Before solving the MIP formulation
of the pricing problem, we first try to solve its linear
relaxation argmax
ξˆT∈VT
c(ξˆT). We found that in many cases
it outputs semi-randomized correlation plans, thus avoiding
the overhead of having to solve a MIP.
Solution pools. Modern commercial MIP solvers such as
Gurobi keep track of additional suboptimal feasible solutions
(in addition to the optimal one) that were found during the
process of solving a MIP. Since accessing those additional
solutions is essentially free computationally, we add to S all
the solutions (even suboptimal ones) that were produced in
the process of solving the MIP. This can be viewed as a form
of dynamic seeding and does not affect the optimality of the
overall algorithm.
Termination. Because fast integer and LP solvers work with
real-valued variables, near the end of the column-generation
loop the new variables that are generated in the pricing
problem have reduced costs that are very close to zero. It is
not clear whether they are actually positive or zero. Therefore,
we set the numeric tolerance so that we stop the column-
generation loop if the value of the pricing problem solution
is less than 10−6.
Dual values. To obtain the dual values used in the pricing
problem, we do not need to formulate and solve a dual LP as
modern LP solvers already keep track of dual values.
8. Experimental Evaluation
We computationally evaluate the algorithms proposed in
Section 6 and Section 7. We test on the common parametric
games shown in Table 1. Appendix B provides additional
detail about the games. We ran the experiments on a machine
with a 16-core 2.40GHz CPU and 32GB of RAM. We used
Gurobi 9.0.3 to solve LPs and MIPs.
Small-Supported TMECor in Practice. Table 2 describes
the maximum expected utility that the team can obtain by
limiting the support of its distribution to n ∈ {1, 2, 3} semi-
randomized correlation plans. Columns denoted by n =
∞ show the optimal expected utility of the team at the
TMECor (without any limit on the support size). We ran
experiments with the opponent as the first (O= 1), second
(O= 2), and third player (O= 3) of each game. In all the
games, distributions with as few as two or three semi-
randomized coordination plans gave the team near-optimal
expected utility. Moreover, in several games, one or two
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Game
Ours Fictitious Team Play (FTP)
CG-18
Pricers Team utility after seeding TMECor
Seeded Not seed. ǫ = 50% ǫ = 10% ǫ = 1% Relax. MIP m = 1 1000 10 000 value
[A] 1ms 1ms 2s† 10s† 1m 08s† 175ms 1 0 −0.500 0 0 0
[B] 1ms 34ms 3m 52s 37m 51s > 6h 26.81s 2 0 −0.365 −0.021 −0.020 −0.042
[C] 17.20s 18.61s 4h 42m > 6h > 6h > 6h 2 25 −0.155 −0.020 −0.020 −0.014
[D] 267ms 682ms 50s 9m 21s > 6h 3m 09s 14 0 −0.436 0.252 0.252 0.252
[E] 1.34s 1.77s 4m 51s 2h 02m > 6h 29m 38s 48 0 −0.830 0.248 0.250 0.253
[F] 1m 41s 11m 22s > 6h > 6h > 6h > 6h 20 7 −0.481 0.252 0.252 0.284
[G] > 6h > 6h > 6h > 6h > 6h > 6h — — −0.688 0.277 oom —
[H] 5m 20s 5m 53s > 6h > 6h > 6h > 6h 23 204 −2.354 0.087 0.125 0.293
[I] 1h 30m 1h 44m > 6h > 6h > 6h > 6h 5 638 −1.827 0.013 0.036 0.085
[J] 11m 08s 14m 49s > 6h > 6h > 6h > 6h 1232 48 −3.333 0.646 0.668 0.836
(a)—Comparison of run times (b) (c)
Table 3: (a) Runtime comparison between our algorithm, FTP, and CG-18. The seeded version of our algorithm runsm = 1000
iterations of CFR+ (Section 7.2), while the non seeded version runsm = 1. ‘†’: since the TMECor value for the game is exactly
zero, we measure how long it took the algorithm to find a distribution with expected value at least −ǫ/10 for the team. (b)
Number of times the pricing problem for our column-generation algorithm was solved to optimality by the linear relaxation
(‘Relax’) and by the MIP solver (‘MIP’) when using our column-generation algorithm. (c) Quality of the initial strategy of the
team obtained for varying sizes of S compared to the expected utility of the team at the TMECor. ‘oom’: out of memory.
carefully selected semi-randomized coordination plans are
enough to reach an optimal solution.
Column-Generation in Practice. We evaluate our column-
generation algorithm against the two prior state-of-the art
algorithms for computing a TMECor: the column-generation
technique by Celli & Gatti (2018) (henceforth CG-18), and
the fictitious-team-play algorithm by Farina et al. (2018)
(denoted FTP). Like our algorithm, CG-18 uses column
generation approach which lets O play sequence-form
strategies, while the team’s strategy is directly represented
as a distribution over joint normal-form plans. On the other
hand, FTP is based on the bilinear saddle-point formulation
of the problem and is essentially a variation of fictitious
play (Brown, 1951). FTP operates on the bilinear formulation
of TMECor (1): the team and the opponent are treated as
two entities that converge to equilibrium in self-play. FTP
only guarantees convergence in the limit to an approximate
TMECor, while our algorithm certifies optimality. So, the
run-time comparison between our algorithm to FTP must
be done with care, as the latter never stops, whereas our
algorithm and CG-18 terminate after a finite number of
iterations with an exact optimal strategy. We report the run
time of FTP reaching solution quality that is ǫ = 50%, 10%,
and 1% off the optimal value (determined by the other two
algorithms).We set a time limit of 6 hours and a cap of at most
four threads for each algorithm. Table 3 shows the results with
the opponent playing as the third player. By Table 2, this is
almost always the hardest setting. The results for the other
two settings are in Appendix C.
Our column-generation algorithm dramatically outperforms
FTP and CG-18. There are settings, such as Liar’s dice
instance [F], where we our algorithm needs just a few seconds
to compute an optimal TMECor, while previous algorithms
exceed 6 hours. The last column of Table 3(c) shows the final
team utility. Even when the opponent is playing as the third
player, the team is able to reach positive expected utility.
Finally, we identify Liar’s dice instance [G] as the current
boundary of problem that just cannot be handled with current
TMECor technology.
Using the linear relaxation of the pricing problem (“imple-
mentation details” in Section 7.2) often obviated the need to
run the slower MIP pricing (see Table 3(b)). In all Goofspiel
instances (games [D] and [E]) and in small Kuhn poker in-
stances, the MIP pricing is never invoked.
Regret-based seeding further ameliorates the performance of
the algorithm. In the Liar’s dice instance [F], it reduced run
time by roughly a factor of ten. The value of the initial
master solution (that is, before the first pricing) increases
significantly with the number of iterations of the no-regret
algorithm used for seeding.
9. Conclusions
We studied the problem of finding an optimal strategy for a
team with two members facing an opponent in an imperfect-
information, zero-sum, extensive-form game. We focused
on the scenario in which team members are not allowed
to communicate during play but can coordinate before the
game. First, we provided modeling results by drawing a
connection to previous results on extensive-form correlation.
Then, we developed an algorithm that computes an optimal
joint distribution by only using profiles where only one of
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the team members gets to randomize in each profile. We can
cap the number of such profiles we allow in the solution. This
begets an anytime algorithm by increasing the cap. Moreover,
we showed that often a handful of well-chosen such profiles
suffices to reach optimal utility for the team. Inspired by
this observation and leveraging theoretical concepts that we
introduced, we developed an efficient column-generation
algorithm for finding an optimal strategy for the team. We
tested our algorithm on a suite of standard games, showing
that it is three order of magnitudes faster than the state of
the art and also solves many games that were previously
intractable.
Broader Impact
Enabling the computation of strong, game-theoretic strategies
for imperfect-information adversarial team games has com-
plex effects. Such technology could be used by a team of ma-
licious players to exploit an interaction or a specific opponent.
On the other hand, the technology could also be used defen-
sively, to play in such a way as to minimize the value that
can be extracted from the agent herself. Whether the tech-
nology has a positive or negative societal impact (or none)
varies depending on the nature of the imperfect-information
interaction and the way the technology is implemented. We
believe that publishing the algorithm increases its dissemi-
nation, thereby helping even the playing field between edu-
cated expert players and ones who might be less privileged
and could thus benefit more from algorithmic strategy sup-
port.
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A. Theoretical Details
A.1. Representing Distributions of Play via
Extensive-Form Correlation Plans
As mentioned in the body, every distribution over randomized
stratregy profiles for the team members is equivalent to
a different distribution over deterministic strategy profiles
by means of Kuhn’s theorem (Kuhn, 1953), one of the
most fundamental results about extensive-formgame playing.
Specifically, given two independent mixed strategies yT1 ∈
YT1 and yT2 ∈ YT2 for the team members, let µT1 and
µT2 be the distributions over normal-form plans ΠT1,ΠT2
equivalent to yT1 and yT2, respectively. Then, the distribution
over reandomized strategy profiles that assignes probability
1 to (yT1,yT2) is equivalent to the product distribution of
µT1 and µT2, that is, the distirbution over ΠT1 × ΠT2 that
picks a generic profile (πT1, πT2)with probability πT1(πT1)×
πT2(πT2). The reverse is also true: a product distribution over
ΠT1 × ΠT2 is equivalent to a distribution over randomized
profiles that picks exactly one profile with probability 1.
We now show that a similar result holds when the distribution
over normal-form plans is represented as an extensive-form
correlation plan. First, we introduce the notion of product
correlation plan.
Definition 3. Let ξT ∈ V be a vector in the von Stengel-
Forges polytope. We say that ξT is a product correlation plan
if
ξT[σT1, σT2] = ξT[σT1,∅] · ξT[∅, σT2]
for all (σT1, σT2) ∈ ΣT1 ⊲⊳ ΣT2.
Lemma 1. A product correlation plan is always an element
of ΞT.
Proof. Let ξT be a product correlation plan. Since by
definition, ξT ∈ V , the vectors yT1,yT2 indexed over ΣT1
and ΣT2, repsectively, and defined as
y[σT1] = ξT[σT1,∅], y[σT2] = ξT[∅, σT2]
are sequence-form strategies. By Kuhn’s theorem, there exist
distributions µT1, µT2 over ΠT1 and ΠT2, respectively, such
that
y[σT1] =
∑
πT1∈ΠT1(σT1)
µT1[πT1] ∀σT1 ∈ ΣT1, (3)
y[σT2] =
∑
πT2∈ΠT2(σT2)
µT2[πT2] ∀σT2 ∈ ΣT2. (4)
Consider the distribution µT over ΠT1 × ΠT2 defined as the
product distribution µT1 ⊗ µT2, that is,
µT[σT1, σT2] := µT1[πT1] · µT2[πT2]
for all (πT1, πT2) ∈ ΠT1 × ΠT2. We will show that is
the extensive-form correlation plan corresponding to µT
according to (2), that is,
ξT[σT1, σT2] :=
∑
πT1∈ΠT1(σT1)
πT2∈ΠT2(σT2)
µT[πT1, πT2]
for all (σT1, σT2) ∈ ΣT1 ⊲⊳ ΣT2. Indeed, using the fact that
ξT is a product correlation plan together with (3) and (4):
ξT[σT1, σT2] = ξT[σT1,∅] · ξT[∅, σT2]
= yT1[σT1] · yT2[σT2]
=

 ∑
πT1∈ΠT1(σT1)
µT1[πT1]



 ∑
πT2∈ΠT2(σT2)
µT2[πT2]


=
∑
πT1∈ΠT1(σT1)
πT2∈ΠT2(σT2)
µT1[πT1] · µT2[πT2]
=
∑
πT1∈ΠT1(σT1)
πT2∈ΠT2(σT2)
µT[πT1, πT2].
This concludes the proof.
Lemma 2. An extensive-form correlation plan is equivalent
to a distribution of play for the team that picks one profile of
randomized strategies (yT1,yT2) ∈ YT1 × YT2 if and only if
ξT is a product correlation plan. Furthermore, when that is
the case, yT1[σT1] = ξT[σT1,∅], yT2[σT2] = ξT[∅, σT2] for
all σT1 ∈ ΣT1, σT2 ∈ ΣT2.
Proof. The proof of Lemma 1 already shows that when ξT is a
product correlation plan, it is equivalent to playing according
to the distribution of play for the team with singleton
support (yT1,yT2), where yT1[σT1] = ξT[σT1,∅], yT2[σT2] =
ξT[∅, σT2] for all σT1 ∈ ΣT1, σT2 ∈ ΣT2. So, the only
statement that remains to prove is that distributions µT over
randomized strategy profiles for the team members with a
singleton support are mapped (Eq. (2)) to product correlation
plans.
Let {(yT1,yT2)} ⊆ YT1 × YT2 be the (singleton) support
of µT, and let µT1, µT2 be distributions over ΠT1 and ΠT2,
respectively, equivalent to yT1 and yT2. Then,
y[σT1] =
∑
πT1∈ΠT1(σT1)
µT1[πT1] ∀σT1 ∈ ΣT1, (5)
y[σT2] =
∑
πT2∈ΠT2(σT2)
µT2[πT2] ∀σT2 ∈ ΣT2. (6)
Since by assumption the two team members sample strategies
independently, their equivalent distribution of play over
determinitic strategies is the product distribution µT := µT1⊗
µT2. Using (2), µT has a representation as extensive-form
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correlation plan given by
ξT[σT1, σT2] =
∑
πT1∈ΠT1(σT1)
πT2∈ΠT2(σT2)
µT[πT1, πT2]
=
∑
πT1∈ΠT1(σT1)
πT2∈ΠT2(σT2)
µT1[πT1] · µT2[πT2]
=

 ∑
πT1∈ΠT1(σT1)
µT1[πT1]



 ∑
πT2∈ΠT2(σT2)
µT2[πT2]


= yT1[σT1] · yT2[σT2] (7)
for all (σT1, σT2) ∈ ΣT1 × ΣT2. In particular, choosing
σT2 = ∅ in (7), and using the fact that yT2[∅] = 1, we obtain
ξT[σT1,∅] = yT1[σT1] ∀ σT1 ∈ ΣT1.
Similarly,
ξT[∅, σT2] = yT2[σT2] ∀ σT2 ∈ ΣT2.
Substituting the last two equalities into (7) we can write
ξT[σT1, σT2] = ξT[σT1,∅] · ξT[∅, σT2]
for all (σT1, σT2) ∈ ΣT1 × ΣT2. That, together with the
inclusion ΞT ⊆ V , shows that ξT is a product correlation
plan.
Semi-randomized correlation plans are product plans In
the body we mentioned that semi-randomized correlation
plans correspond to a distribution of play where one team
member plays a deterministic strategy and the other team
member plays a randomized strategy. We now give more
formal grounding that that assertion.
Lemma 3. Let ξT ∈ Ξ
∗
T1
∪ Ξ∗
T2
be a semi-randomized plan.
Then, ξT is a product plan.
We reuse some ideas that already appeared in Farina & Sandholm
(2020) to prove Lemma 3. In particular, in the proof we will
make use of the following lemma.
Lemma 4 (Farina & Sandholm (2020, Lemma 6)). Let
ξT ∈ V . For all σT1 ∈ ΣT1 such that ξT[σT1,∅] = 0,
ξT[σT1, σT2] = 0 for all σT2 ∈ ΣT2 : σT1 ⊲⊳ σT2. Similarly,
for all σT2 ∈ ΣT2 such that ξT[∅, σT2] = 0, ξT[σT1, σT2] = 0
for all σT1 ∈ ΣT1 : σT1 ⊲⊳ σT2.
Proof of Lemma 3. We will only show the proof for the case
ξT ∈ Ξ
∗
T1
. The other case (ξT ∈ Ξ
∗
T2
) is symmetric.
To show that
ξT[σT1, σT2] = ξT[σT1,∅] · ξT[∅, σT2]
for all (σT1, σT2) ∈ ΣT1 ⊲⊳ ΣT2, we perform induction on
the depth of the sequence σT2. The depth depth(σT2) of a
generic sequence σT2 = (J, b) ∈ ΣT2 of Player i is defined
as the number of actions that Player T2 plays on the path
from the root of the tree down to action b at information set
J , included. Conventionally, we let the depth of the empty
sequence be 0.
The base case for the induction proof corresponds to the case
where σT2 has depth 0, that is, σT2 = ∅. In that case, the
theorem is clearly true, because ξT[∅,∅] = 1 as part of the
von Stengel-Forges constraints (Definition 1).
Now, suppose that the statement holds as long as depth(σT2) ≤
d. We will show that the statement will hold for any
(σT1, σT2) ∈ ΣT1 ⊲⊳ ΣT2 such that depth(σT2) ≤ d + 1.
Indeed, consider (σT1, σT2) ∈ ΣT1 ⊲⊳ ΣT2 such that σT2 =
(J, b) with depth(σT2) = d+ 1.
There are only two possible cases:
• Case 1: ξT[∅, σT2] = 0. From Lemma 4, ξT[σT1, σT2] =
0 and the statement holds.
• Case 2: ξT[∅, σT2] = 1. From the von Stengel-Forges
constraints, ξT[∅, σ(J)] =
∑
b′∈AJ
ξT[∅, (J, b
′)] =
1 +
∑
b′∈AJ ,b′ 6=b
ξT[∅, (J, b
′)] ≥ 1. Hence, because all
entries of ξT[∅, σ2] are in {0, 1} by definition of Ξ
∗
T1
, it
must be ξT[∅, σ(J)] = 1 and ξT[∅, (J, b
′)] = 0 for all
b′ ∈ AJ , b
′ 6= b.
Using the inductive hypothesis, we have that
ξT[σT1, σ(J)] = ξT[σT1,∅] · ξT[∅, σ(J)] = ξT[σT1,∅]
(8)
for all σT1 ∈ ΣT1, σT1 ⊲⊳ σ(J). On the other hand, since
ξT[∅, (J, b
′)] = 0 for all b′ ∈ AJ , b
′ 6= b, from Lemma 4
we have that
ξT[σT1, (J, b
′)] = 0 ∀σT1 ⊲⊳ J, b
′ 6= b. (9)
Hence, summing over all b′ ∈ AJ and using the von
Stengel-Forges constraints, we get
ξT[σT1,∅] · ξT[∅, σT2] = ξT[σT1, σ(J)]
=
∑
b′∈AJ
ξT[σT1, (J, b
′)]
= ξT[σT1, (J, b)] = ξT[σT1, σT2]
for all σT1 ⊲⊳ (J, b). This concludes the proof by
induction.
So, from Lemma 2 it follows that semi-randomized plans
correspond to distributions of play over randomized profiles
with the singleton support (yT1,yT2) ∈ YT1 × YT2.
Furthermore, because of the second part of Lemma 2, when
ξT ∈ Ξ
∗
T1
, yT2[σT2] ∈ {0, 1} for all σT2 ∈ ΣT2, which means
that yT2 is a deterministic strategy for Player T2 (a similar
statement holds for ξT ∈ Ξ
∗
T2
).
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Convex combinations of product plans Both of the
algorithms we presented in the paper ultimately produce
an extensive-form correlation plan ξT that is a convex
combination of semi-randomized plans ξ
(1)
T
, . . . , ξ
(n)
T
, that is,
of the form
ξT = λ
(1)ξ
(1)
T
+ ·+ λ(n)ξ
(n)
T
for λ(i) ≥ 0 such that λ(1) + · · · + λ(n) = 1. Since
semi-randomized correlation plans are product correlation
plans (Lemma 3), from Lemma 2 each ξ
(i)
T
is equivalent to
the team playing a single profile of randomized strategies
(y
(i)
T1
,y
(i)
T2
) ∈ YT1 ×YT2 with probability 1. By linearity, it is
immediate to show that ξT is equivalent to playing according
to the distribution over randomized strategies for the team that
picks (y
(i)
T1
,y
(i)
T2
) with probability λ(i).
A.2. TMECor Formulation Based on Extensive-Form
Correlation Plans
Proposition 1. An extensive-form correlation plan ξT is a
TMECor if and only if it is a solution to the LP


argmax
ξT
v∅, subject to:
1 vI −
∑
I′∈IO
σO(I
′)=(I,a)
vI′ ≤
∑
z∈Z
σO(z)=(I,a)
uˆT(z)ξT[σT1(z), σT2(z)]
∀ (I,a)∈ΣO\{∅}
2 v∅ −
∑
I′∈IO
σO(I
′)=∅
vI′ ≤
∑
z∈Z
σO(z)=∅
uˆT(z)ξT[σT1(z), σT2(z)]
3 v∅ free, vI free ∀ I ∈ IO
4 ξT ∈ ΞT.
Proof. We follow the steps mentioned in the body, starting
from the bilinear saddle point problem formulation of the
problem of computing a TMECor strategy for the team:
argmax
ξT∈ΞT
min
yO∈YO
∑
z∈Z
uˆT(z)ξT[σT1(z), σT2(z)]y[σO(z)].
Expanding the constraint yO ∈ YO using the sequence-form
constraints (Koller et al., 1996; von Stengel, 1996), the inner
minimization problem is
(P ) :


min
yO
∑
z∈Z
uˆT(z)ξT[σT1(z), σT2(z)]y[σO(z)]
1 − y[σ(I)] +
∑
a∈AI
yO[(I, a)] = 0 ∀I ∈ IO
2 yO[∅] = 1
3 yO[σO] ≥ 0 ∀ σO ∈ ΣO.
Introducing the free dual variables {vI : I ∈ IO} for
Constraint 1 , and the free dual variable v∅ for Constraint
2 , we obtain the dual linear program
(D) :


max
vI ,v∅
v∅, subject to:
1 vI −
∑
I′∈IO
σO(I
′)=(I,a)
vI′ ≤
∑
z∈Z
σO(z)=(I,a)
uˆT(z)ξT[σT1(z), σT2(z)]
∀ (I,a)∈ΣO\{∅}
2 v∅ −
∑
I′∈IO
σO(I
′)=∅
vI′ ≤
∑
z∈Z
σO(z)=∅
uˆT(z)ξT[σT1(z), σT2(z)]
3 v∅ free, vI free ∀ I ∈ IO.
So, ξT is a TMECor if and only if it is a solution of
argmaxξT∈ΞT(D), which is exactly the statement.
A.3. Semi-Randomized Correlation Plans
Proposition 3. In every game, ΞT is the convex hull of the set
Ξ∗
T1
, or equivalently of the set Ξ∗
T2
. Formally, ΞT = coΞ
∗
T1
=
coΞ∗
T2
= co(Ξ∗
T1
∪ Ξ∗
T2
).
Proof. We will show that ΞT = coΞ
∗
T1
. The proof that
ΞT = coΞ
∗
T2
is symmetric.
We will break the proof of ΞT = coΞ
∗
T1
into two parts:
(⊆) In the first part of the proof, we argue that Ξ∗
T1
⊆
ΞT. This is straightforward: from Lemma 3 we know
that all elements of Ξ∗
T1
are product correlation plans
(Definition 3), which implies that Ξ∗
T1
⊆ ΞT by
Lemma 1. Since convex hulls preserve inclusions, we
have
co Ξ∗T1 ⊆ coΞT,
which is exactly the statement Ξ∗
T1
⊆ ΞT upon using
the known fact that ΞT is a convex polytope and
therefore coΞT = ΞT.
(⊇) To complete the proof, we now argue that the reverse
inclusion, namely ΞT ⊆ coΞ
∗
T1
, also holds. Let
f : µT 7→ ξT be the mapping from the distribution
of play µT ∈ ∆(ΠT1 × ΠT2) to its corresponding
extensive-form correlation plan defined in Eq. (2). By
definition, ΞT = f(∆(ΠT1 × ΠT2)). Let 1(πT1,πT2)
denote the distribution of play with singleton support
(πT1, πT2), that is, the distribution of play that assigns
the deterministic strategy profile (πT1, πT2) for the
team with probability 1. Since f is linear, and since
∆(ΠT1×ΠT2) = co{1(πT1,πT2) : πT1 ∈ ΠT1, πT2 ∈ ΠT2},
we have
ΞT = co{f(1(πT1,πT2)) : πT1 ∈ ΠT1, πT2 ∈ ΠT2}.
Hence, to conclude the proof of this part, it will be
enough to show that for each πT1 ∈ ΠT1, πT2 ∈ ΠT2,
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it holds that f(1(πT1,πT2)) ∈ Ξ
∗
T1
. Since 1(πT1,πT2)
assigns probability 1 to one profile and 0 to all other
profiles, f(1(πT1,πT2)) is an extensive-form correlation
plan whose entris are all in {0, 1}. So, in particular,
f(1(πT1,πT2)) ∈ Ξ
∗
T1
. This concludes the proof of the
inclusion ΞT ⊆ coΞ
∗
T1
.
Together, the two statements that we just prove show that
ΞT = coΞ
∗
T1
.
Finally, using the fact that unions and convex hulls commute,
we have
co(Ξ∗T1 ∪ Ξ
∗
T2) = (coΞ
∗
T1) ∪ (co Ξ
∗
T2) = ΞT ∪ ΞT = ΞT,
thereby concluding the proof.
B. Game Instances
The size of the parametric instances we use as benchmark is
described in Table 1. In the following, we provide a detailed
explanation of the rules of each game.
Kuhn poker Two-player Kuhn poker was originally pro-
posed by Kuhn (1950). We employ the three-player variation
described in Farina et al. (2018). In a three-playerKuhn poker
game with rank r there are r possible cards. At the beginning
of the game, each player pays one chip to the pot, and each
player is dealt a single private card. The first player can check
or bet, i.e., putting an additional chip in the pot. Then, the
second player can check or bet after a first player’s check, or
fold/call the first player’s bet. If no bet was previously made,
the third player can either check or bet. Otherwise, the player
has to fold or call. After a bet of the second player (resp.,
third player), the first player (resp., the first and the second
players) still has to decide whether to fold or to call the bet.
At the showdown, the player with the highest card who has
not folded wins all the chips in the pot.
Goofspiel This bidding game was originally introduced by
Ross (1971). We use a 3-rank variant, that is, each player has
a hand of cards with values {−1, 0, 1}. A third stack of cards
with values {−1, 0, 1} is shuffled and placed on the table. At
each turn, a prize card is revealed, and each player privately
chooses one of his/her cards to bid, with the highest card
winning the current prize. In case of a tie, the prize is split
evenly among the winners. After 3 turns, all the prizes have
been dealt out and the payoff of each player is computed as
follows: each prize cards value is equal to its face value and
the players scores are computed as the sum of the values of
the prize cards they have won.
Goofspiel with limited information This is a variant
of Goofspiel introduced by Lanctot et al. (2009). In this
variation, in each turn the players do not reveal the cards
that they have played. Rather, they show their cards to a
fair umpire, which determines which player has played the
highest card and should therefore received the prize card.
In case of tie, the umpire directs the players to split the
prize evenly among the winners, just like in the Goofspiel
game. This makes the game strategically more challenging as
players have less information regarding previous opponents
actions.
Leduc poker We use a three-player version of the classical
Leduc hold’em poker introduced by Southey et al. (2005).We
employ game instances of rank 3, in which the deck consists
of three suits with 3 cards each. Our instances are parametric
in the maximum number of bets, which in limit hold’em is
not necessarely tied to the number of players. The maximum
number of raise per betting round can be either 1, 2 or 3. As
the game starts players pay one chip to the pot. There are two
betting rounds. In the first one a single private card is dealt
to each player while in the second round a single board card
is revealed. The raise amount is set to 2 and 4 in the first and
second round, respectively.
Liar’s dice Liar’s dice is another standard benchmark in-
troduced by Lisy` et al. (2015). In our three-player implemen-
tation, at the beginning of the game each of the three players
privately rolls an unbiased k-face die. Then, the three players
alternate in making (potentially false) claims about their toss.
The first player begins bidding, announcing any face value
up to k and the minimum number of dice that the player be-
lieves are showing that value among the dice of all the play-
ers. Then, each player has two choices during their turn: to
make a higher bid, or to challenge the previous bid by declar-
ing the previous bidder a ”liar”. A bid is higher than the pre-
vious one if either the face value is higher, or the number of
dice is higher. If the current player challenges the previous
bid, all dice are revealed. If the bid is valid, the last bidder
wins and obtains a reward of +1 while the challenger obtains
a negative payoff of -1. Otherwise, the challenger wins and
gets reward +1, and the last bidder obtains reward of -1. All
the other players obtain reward 0. We test our algorithms on
Liar’s dice instances with k = 3 and k = 4.
C. Additional Experimental Results
All experiments were run 10 times, and the experimental
tables show average run times. We always use the same
random seed to sample no-regret strategies for the team
members in the seeding phase of our column-generation
algorithm. The seed was never changed, and we don’t treat it
as a hyperparameter. So, all algorithms are deterministic, and
the only source of randomness in the run time is due to system
load. Consequently, we observed small standard deviations in
the run times, less than 10% in all cases.
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We used the same time limit for FTP that was found to
be beneficial by the original authors (Farina et al., 2018),
namely 15 seconds. For FTP and CG-18, we used the original
implementations, with permission from the authors. In all
algorithms, we observed that the majority of time is spent
within Gurobi.
Table 4 and Table 5 show the comparison between our
column-generation algorithm, FTP, and CG-18 when the
opponent plays as the first and as the second player,
respectively.
Comparison between the Algorithm of Section 6 and the
Prior State of the Art
Depending on the cap n on the number or semi-randomized
correlation plans, the algorithm we describe in Section 6
might not reach the optimal TMECor value for the team
(although, as we argue in Section 8, a very small n already
guarantees a large fraction of the optimal value empirically).
For completeness, we report the run time of the algorithm for
a sample instance.We employ instance [H] with O = 3 as it is
has a good trade-off between dimensions and manageability.
When n = 1 the algorithm reaches an optimal solution in
9.74s. The optimal solution with n = 1 achieves 63% of the
optimal utility with no restrictions on the number of plans.
With n = 2 the run time is 5m38s and the solution reaches
84% of the optimal value.
The column-generation algorithm has better run time perfor-
mances and guarantees to reach an optimal solution without
having to pick the right support size. However, we observe
that the algorithm of Section 6 already outperforms FTP and
CG-18. Specifically, FTP cannot reach a strategy guarantee-
ing 50% of the optimal utility within the time limit, while
our algorithm guarantees 84% of the optimal value within
roughly 5 minutes. On the other hand, CG-18 cannot com-
plete even a single iteration within the time limit. This con-
firms the our pricing formulation is significantly tighter than
previous formulations.
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Game
Ours Fictitious Team Play (FTP)
CG-18
Pricers Team utility after seeding TMECor
Seeded Not seed. ǫ = 50% ǫ = 10% ǫ = 1% Relax. MIP m = 1 1000 10 000 value
[A] 2ms 1ms 0ms† 15.00s† 2m 35s† 66ms 5 0 −0.567 −0.133 −0.133 0
[B] 21ms 3ms 0ms 16m 39s > 6h 1.01s 0 3 −0.375 0.037 0.038 0.038
[C] 5.69s 5.79s 7m 36s > 6h > 6h > 6h 8 41 −0.166 0.058 0.058 0.066
[D] 186ms 304ms 2ms > 6h > 6h 1m 56s 19 0 −0.492 0.251 0.252 0.252
[E] 464ms 860ms 6ms > 6h > 6h 23m 17s 33 0 −1.000 0.249 0.253 0.253
[F] 2.14s 4.21s 19m 25s > 6h > 6h > 6h 1 0 −0.748 0 0 0
[G] 1m 11s 41m 23s > 6h > 6h > 6h > 6h 0 2 −0.721 0.063 oom 0.063
[H] 43.72s 1m 24s 2h 49m > 6h > 6h > 6h 9 79 −3.142 0.210 0.228 0.277
[I] 43m 58s 46m 08s > 6h > 6h > 6h > 6h 0 614 −3.091 0.111 0.122 0.142
[J] 3m 48s 11m 36s > 6h > 6h > 6h > 6h 1612 37 −4.000 0.627 0.651 0.836
(a)—Comparison of run times (b) (c)
Table 4: Results for O = 1. (a) Runtime comparison between our algorithm, FTP, and CG-18. The seeded version of our
algorithm runsm = 1000 iterations of CFR+ (Section 7.2), while the non seeded version runs m = 1. ‘†’: since the TMECor
value for the game is exactly zero, we measure how long it took the algorithm to find a distribution with expected value at least
−ǫ/10 for the team. (b) Number of times the pricing problem for our column-generation algorithm was solved to optimality
by the linear relaxation (‘Relax’) and by the MIP solver (‘MIP’) when using our column-generation algorithm (seeded version
withm = 1000). (c) Quality of the initial strategy of the team obtained for varying sizes of S compared to the expected utility
of the team at the TMECor. ‘oom’: out of memory.
Game
Ours Fictitious Team Play (FTP)
CG-18
Pricers Team utility after seeding TMECor
Seeded Not seed. ǫ = 50% ǫ = 10% ǫ = 1% Relax. MIP m = 1 1000 10 000 value
[A] 0ms 1ms 0ms† 19s† 3m 09s† 147ms 1 0 −0.633 0.000 0.000 0
[B] 0ms 11ms 1m 39s > 6h > 6h 7.53s 1 0 −0.250 0.027 0.027 0.027
[C] 6.47s 5.64s 48m 08s > 6h > 6h > 6h 6 33 −0.126 0.027 0.033 0.038
[D] 144ms 368ms 1ms > 6h > 6h 1m 46s 14 0 −0.384 0.252 0.252 0.252
[E] 641ms 904ms 1.39s > 6h > 6h 12m 30s 40 0 −3.000 0.252 0.252 0.253
[F] 55.00s 8m 59s 1h 30m > 6h > 6h > 6h 21 0 −0.630 0.256 0.256 0.256
[G] > 6h > 6h > 6h > 6h > 6h > 6h — — −0.766 0.264 oom —
[H] 7m 30s 8m 05s > 6h > 6h > 6h > 6h 25 335 −2.002 0.177 0.201 0.345
[I] 57m 32s 1h 09m > 6h > 6h > 6h > 6h 1 492 −2.505 0.096 0.110 0.142
[J] 7m 11s 5m 16s > 6h > 6h > 6h > 6h 2508 37 −7.500 0.630 0.819 0.971
(a)—Comparison of run times (b) (c)
Table 5: Results for O = 2. (a) Runtime comparison between our algorithm, FTP, and CG-18. The seeded version of our
algorithm runsm = 1000 iterations of CFR+ (Section 7.2), while the non seeded version runs m = 1. ‘†’: since the TMECor
value for the game is exactly zero, we measure how long it took the algorithm to find a distribution with expected value at least
−ǫ/10 for the team. (b) Number of times the pricing problem for our column-generation algorithm was solved to optimality
by the linear relaxation (‘Relax’) and by the MIP solver (‘MIP’) when using our column-generation algorithm (seeded version
withm = 1000). (c) Quality of the initial strategy of the team obtained for varying sizes of S compared to the expected utility
of the team at the TMECor. ‘oom’: out of memory.
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